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I. INTRODUCTION
For a majority of Medicaid recipients, managed health care1 is
fast becoming a reality.2 As state governments seek to control
Medicaid costs in a world of limited resources, unlimited
reimbursement for any treatment a doctor deems necessary is no
longer feasible. 3 One major tool for cost containment has been the
privatization of the delivery of Medicaid coverage into managed care
organizations. 4 The shift to a managed plan means that services will
be rationed. This rationing occurs because capitated rates,5 for
example, require that private managed care organizations 6 ("MCOs")
1. 'Managed health care" refers to a system of health insurance combined with controls
over the delivery of the health services via Managed Care Organizations ("MCOs"). Marc A.
Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1007, 1009 n.1 (1996). MCOs "manage" health care services by controlling the kind, volume,
and manner in which services are provided. Id. They control the dispensing of these services by
choosing providers and by controlling the providers' behavior through financial incentives, rules,
and organizational control. Id. Managed care shifts from a traditional "fee-for-service" system,
which reimburses providers based on services provided at their discretion, to a system in which
the MCO either directly provides a set of contracted services, or manages the provider of the
services in exchange for a fixed monthly premium per enrollee. Id. See also Eleanor D. Kinney,
Medicare Managed Care from the Beneficiary's Perspective, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1163, 1173-81
(1996) (discussing managed care in the context of Medicare).
2. The shift to managed care delivery systems fundamentally changes Medicaid. By
1994, forty-three states and the District of Columbia had some form of managed care initiative,
placing 32% of all Medicaid enrollees in managed care systems. See Marsha Gold, Michael
Sparer, and Karyen Chu, Medicaid Managed Care: Lessons from Five States, 15 Health Affairs
153 (Fall 1996). See also Philip Boyle, Managed Care in Mental Health: A Cure, or a Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. 437, 437 (1996) (positing that "[b]y most accounts
this move towards managed care, including managed care in mental health, is unstoppable")
(citation omitted)).
3. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 435 (1988).
4. As states seek to control costs, some believe the states will discriminate against se-
verely mentally ill citizens outright. They assert that the limitations inherent in rationing
managed care systems and block grants will subject those systems to challenge under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. For a complete discussion, see Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending
Discrimination Against Mental Health Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 St. Louis
U. L. J. 315, 318 (1996).
5. Under commonly used capitated rate schemes, a provider group, usually an MCO,
receives a set fee per enrollee. The provider then supplies all necessary physician services, with
the primary care physician serving as the "gatekeeper" to hospital services and specialists. If
the enrollee's expenses exceed the amount of the fee, the provider group, and sometimes the
provider, is financially liable for the difference. Because the payments are separate from the
services actually rendered, the provider group acts as an insurer. Thus to make money on the
flat fee paid as the capitated rate, it is in the provider group's best interest to control costs.
Vernellia Randall, et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing the State Applications, 26
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1069, 1132 n.353 (1996).
6. For purposes of this Note, an MCO is an organization that, through an organized
system of health care, provides or ensures the delivery of an agreed upon set of health
maintenance and treatment services for an enrolled group of persons under a capitation
arrangement. Daniel Y. Patterson and Steven S. Sharfstein, The Future of Mental Health Care
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bear the risk of providing services to the Medicaid population and
attempt to profit from a flat-rate fee system.7
The managed care trend is causing a paradigm shift for
Medicaid.8 Medicaid originated in an era when the government was
not as concerned about controlling health care costs.9  Today,
Medicaid's mandates sometimes conflict with efforts to control health
care costs.10 This conflict manifests itself in the Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment ("EPSDT) mandate of the
Medicaid Act.,, The "T' in the EPSDT provides broad coverage.
Treatment is available to Medicaid-eligible children under twenty-one
years of age, and the EPSDT requires states to provide any service
that Medicaid offers and a physician has deemed "medically
necessary."'12 Such treatment is required even if the state does not
provide it to the adult Medicaid population. 13
This Note attempts to demonstrate how the EPSDT, as a broad
mandate created before managed care, has the potential to diminish
the effectiveness of managed care's cost saving efforts, particularly in
the area of managed mental health care. Part II of this Note provides
the background of Medicaid, describing the fiscal problems it has
presented and the solution offered by Tennessee's attempt to control
costs through managed care. Part III discusses Medicaid's EPSDT re-
quirement and the challenges it may present to Medicaid managed
care cost containment efforts. The Note then suggests two steps to
in Judith L. Feldman and Richard J. Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care 336
(American Psychiatric Press, 1992). Such an organization may also be called a Health
Maintenance Organization ('HMO"). Id. In Tennessee, however, this third party payer is
labeled an MCO. The mental health care services in Tennessee are provided through similarly
functioning "behavioral health organizations" ("BHOs").
7. The health care industry has developed three models for Medicaid managed-care
systems. Diane Rowland and Kristina Hanson, Medicaid: Moving to Managed Care, 15 Health
Affairs 150, 150 (Fall 1996). First, under a "fee-for-service" arrangement, the provider is also
the primary care physician. The physician receives a monthly fee to approve and monitor
medical services but is not financially liable for the patient's care. Id. Second, in a capitated or
full-risk plan, a fixed monthly fee goes to the provider, which may be an organization that, in
turn, provides all care for the patient and assumes full financial risk for each enrollee's care. Id.
Third, a limited risk prepaid health plan allows clinics to contract on a prepaid, capitated risk
basis for a limited range of services. Id.
8. By 1995, nearly one-third of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care
arrangements, compared to 3% in 1983. Id.
9. For example, in 1965, the year Medicaid began, health care costs comprised about 4%
of the gross national product. By 1985, they had doubled to eight percent. Patterson and
Sharfstein, The Future of Mental Health Care, in Feldman and Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed
Mental Health Care at 336 (cited in note 6).
10. Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1070 (cited in note 5).
11. Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994 ed.).
12. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
13. Id.
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reconcile the goals of the EPSDT with the goals of Medicaid managed
mental health care. First, it encourages states seeking to meet the
EPSDT's requirements to do so by adopting an incentive program for
the screening portion of the EPSDT. Second, Part IV suggests that
mental health care presents some unique challenges in a capitated
system faced with full enforcement of the EPSDT. Therefore, in order
to realize an active and willing enforcement of the EPSDT in the
managed mental health care environment, Congress must allow
states to define which services are "medically necessary" for purposes
of a managed mental health care program. In addition, Congress
clearly must allow that definition to apply to the EPSDT. Only then
can a state ensure fulfillment of the EPSDT while meeting its goal of
controlling costs in a managed care environment.
Part V reviews Tennessee's "TennCare Partners" program for
managed Medicaid mental health care in light of the two suggested
steps. Tennessee has introduced its Medicaid mental health care
coverage within a relatively unique system of "carving out" a separate
mental health care delivery system. 14 This carve-out system allows
this Note to focus on the EPSDT within managed mental health care,
where unique concerns about effective and necessary diagnosis and
treatment clash with efforts to save costs through managed care. The
Note first addresses how the TennCare Partners program, like many
other managed care programs, is fumbling its responsibility to exe-
cute the EPSDT, in part because the state did not properly contract
for the EPSDT, and in part because MCOs are often not fully aware of
the EPSDT's breadth. Second, the Note analyzes how TennCare
Partners defines "medically necessary." It then explains how
Tennessee's definition of medical necessity would operate if Congress
allowed it to apply to the treatment portion of the EPSDT.
II. BACKGROUND ON MEDICAID
In 1965, Congress established Medicaid as a cooperative fed-
eral and state program to provide necessary medical services to low-
income persons. 15 State governments are primarily responsible for
administering the program, but to qualify for receipt of federal
Medicaid funds, a state must abide by federal guidelines.16 These
14. See note 157 and accompanying text.
15. Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1070 (cited in note 5).
16. Beltran v. Myers, 701 F.2d 91, 92 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that participating states must
abide by federal Medicaid guidelines). See also Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1071
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guidelines require a state's plan to provide that the amount, duration,
and scope of each covered service must remain sufficient to reason-
ably achieve the purpose of the service provided.17 The federal gov-
ernment therefore prevents states from denying or reducing the
amount, duration, or scope of Medicaid-covered services based on the
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition of the enrollee. s Coverage is
not limitless, however. A state "may place appropriate limits on a
service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization
control procedures."' 9
Medicaid is expensive. The program costs $131 billion per year
to cover thirty-three million low-income Americans. 20 Furthermore,
the cost continues to rise, with Medicaid spending doubling between
1988 and 1992, and projected to double again in the next five to seven
years.21 Much of that increase stems from Medicaid's structure as a
fee-for-service program.2 2  In a Medicaid fee-for-service program, a
doctor decides what treatments are necessary, provides them, and is
reimbursed for the procedures.23 Such a program places few
restrictions on the doctor's choices and decisions.24 Thus, the doctor
often has no incentive to limit the treatment ordered, which leads to
rising costs. 25
In 1994, Tennessee, like every state,26 faced the dilemma of
trying to control rapidly increasing health care costs and, at the same
(cited in note 5) (stating that as long as states remain within federal guidelines, they can struc-
ture their own Medicaid programs).
17. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1995). See Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1071 nn.5-7
(cited in note 5) (outlining federal guidelines for state Medicaid programs covering the amount,
duration, and scope of services; eligibility; and payment structures).
18. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c).
19. Id. § 440.230(d). Whenever a state takes actions that reduce, suspend, or terminate
Medicaid services, the state must give the enrollee ten days' written notice and an opportunity
to appeal, and the state must maintain services during the appeals process. See generally 42
U.S.C. § 1396(a). For a discussion of how "medically necessary" serves as a limiting principal,
see Part 11.B.2.
20. Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1072 (cited in note 5) (citation omitted).
21. Id.
22. Patterson and Sharfstein, The Future of Mental Health Care, in Feldman and
Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care at 336 (cited in note 6).
23. For a more detailed explanation, see note 7.
24. Medicaid's fee-for-service payment structure was "retrospective, usual, and custom-
ary." Patterson and Shaftstein, The Future of Mental Health Care, in Feldman and Fitzpatrick,
eds., Managed Mental Health Care at 336 (cited in note 6). In other words, most treatments a
provider prescribed were reimbursed without the third party controls present in managed care.
25. Id.
26. For a discussion of the role and growth of managed care in the United States, see
generally John IC Iglehart, The American Health Care Systemn: Managed Care, 327 New Eng. J.
Med. 742 (1992).
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time, meet the needs of a growing Medicaid population. 27 The
uncontrolled growth of Medicaid costs threatened both the quality of
health care and the financial stability of the state.28 In response,
Tennessee sought a section 1115 waiver 29 to the Medicaid program in
order to transfer its Medicaid population, as well as a certain number
of uninsured Tennesseans, into a managed care program.30
The program, named TennCare, 31 moved all of Tennessee's
Medicaid enrollees into managed care organizations. 32 In doing so,
Tennessee moved away from Medicaid's traditional fee-for-service
payment structure into a managed care program with capitated rates.
The state implemented TennCare on an extremely short timeline and
encountered several glitches in the beginning.33 Now entering its
fourth year, TennCare generally is deemed a success. Tennessee is
27. For a review of four states' responses to the health care crisis, see Jean I. Thorne, et
al., State Perspectives on Health Care Reform: Oregon, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Rhode Island, 16
Health Care Financial Rev. 121 (Spring 1995). See also John K. Iglehart, Medicaid and
Managed Care, 332 New Eng. J. Med. 1727, 1728-31 (1995).
28. Don Sundquist, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Testimony to the House
Commerce Health and Environment Medicaid and Revisions (June 8, 1995) (on file with the
Author). See also TennCare" A New Direction in Health Care Web Site
<http://www.state.tn.uslhealth/tenncare> (visited Jan. 23, 1997) ("[S]imply maintaining the
previous level of Medicaid Services would have required annual tax increases and/or annual
reductions in services that were unacceptable"). In fiscal year 1990, Tennessee's Medicaid
program cost $1.4 billion in federal and state money. By 1993, the cost had doubled to $2.8
billion, and it was estimated that it would soar to $4.6 billion by fiscal year 1998. Sidney D.
Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21
Am. J. L. & Med. 191, 203 (1994) (assessing the design and implementation of TennCare).
29. A section 1115 waiver, pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994
ed.), seeks to cut costs by eliminating "unnecessary care." The Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA"), as the governing body for Medicaid, will waive the federal
requirements of the Medicaid Act if the state's proposed plan "promote[s] the objectives of the
Medicaid program." Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1075 (cited in note 5). Waivers
seek to offer "cost neutrality for the federal government; reduce health care costs for the state,
and increase services without reducing the quality of service for enrollees." Id. See also 42
U.S.C. § 1315(a). Presently fifteen states have obtained section 1115 waivers, with ten more
under review. TennCare. A New Direction in Health Care (cited in note 28). In the Medicaid
system, states may also seek section 1915(b) "freedom of choice" waivers, which allow states to
require Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in managed care only in part of a state or for certain
categories of benefits. Rowland and Hanson, 15 Health Affairs at 152 (cited in note 7).
30. For an overview of the TennCare program, see generally Martin Goltleib, The Cutting
Edge: Tennessee's Health Care Revolution, N.Y. Times 1 (Oct. 1-2, 1995).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. For an overview of the implementation and structure of the TennCare program, see
Watson, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. at 205, 208 (cited in note 28) (attributing many start-up difficulties
to Tennessee's lack of managed care experience).
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currently one of the most heavily insured states in the country,34 and
most consumers and consumer advocates are pleased with the pro-
gram.35
III. MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAID, MANAGED CARE, AND THE EPSDT
PROGRAM
When Tennessee sought to convert its Medicaid program from
a fee-for-service medical assistance system to a managed care
program, the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA")
approved the new system with the caveat that the approval did not
effectively waive any Medicaid provisions other than those waived
expressly.36 Tennessee did not seek to waive the EPSDT program's
services for eligible individuals under twenty-one years of age.3
The EPSDT became a part of the Medicaid program during the
War on Poverty in 1967.38 Its goal is to provide children on welfare
with the greatest amount of health care possible through the use of
periodic checkups, immunizations, and needed corrective treat-
ments.39 In particular, the statute requires early and periodic screens
for a range of medical, vision, hearing, and dental conditions.40 In
addition, the EPSDT covers diagnostic and treatment services for
34. TennCare Receives Guarded Praise, Problems Persist, 3 Health Care Pol. Rep. 37, S-27
(Sept. 18, 1995) (quoting Rusty Siebert, TennCare Bureau Director, as stating that the
TennCare program has successfully reduced double-digit increases in Medicaid spending to
increases of only 1% to 2% while expanding coverage to 400,000 previously uninsured
Tennesseans).
35. Watson, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. at 209 (cited in note 28).
36. "[A]pproval of the TennCare demonstration does not have the effect of waiving any
provision of law or regulation... that [has] not been expressly waived." Letter from George J.
Scheiber, HCFA Director of Office of Research and Demonstrations, to H. Russell White (Apr.
21, 1994) (on file with the Author) ("Scheiber Letter").
37. Tennessee could have asked for a waiver from the EPSDT program, as Florida and
Oregon did. Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1085 (cited in note 5).
38. Roberta Riportella-Muller, et al., Barriers to the Use of Preventive Health Care
Services for Children, 3 Pub. Health Rep. 71, 71 (Jan. 1996). The program was introduced by
President Lyndon Johnson in 1967. Sara Rosenbaum and Kay Johnson, Providing Health Care
for Low Income Children: Reconciling Child Health Goals with Child Health Financing
Realities, 64 Milbank Q. 442, 453 (1986).
39. See Jane Perkins, An Advocate's Medicaid EPSDT Reference Manual 1 (National
Health Law Program, 1993). The program seems to save money on medical expenses. In
Michigan, one study found that children who utilized the screening program had lower
aggregate medical costs than those children who did not use EPSDT services. William J. Keller,
Study of Selected Outcomes of the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment
Program in Michigan, 98 Pub. Health Rep. 110, 114 (Mar./Apr. 1983).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(B). Medical screens must include a comprehensive health and
development screen for physical and mental health, an unclothed physical exam, appropriate
immunizations, lead poisoning testing, and health education. Id.
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both physical and mental conditions. 41 The definition of treatment
services is broad, and it includes access to all services that Medicaid
covers, regardless of whether the same services are covered for adults
over twenty-one. 42 In short, if the treatment is effective, it must be
covered. 43 Even a "screen" is broadly interpreted to mean almost any
contact between a child and a health care professional.44 A child on
Medicaid therefore has access to a broad range of treatments for
ailments discovered during most any contact between the child and a
health care professional.45 This broad coverage was bolstered by the
1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA"), which prohibits
states from excluding any service that federal Medicaid law
recognizes. 46 OBRA in effect revokes a state's authority to restrict the
EPSDT's benefits to those offered by the state's Medicaid program, as
determined by the state's definition of "medically necessary."47
In addition to the screens, the EPSDT requires states to pro-
vide assistance in services such as transportation4 and case manage-
ment,49 as well as to collect data reporting EPSDT eligibility and
41. The EPSDT requires "necessary health care, diagnostic services and other measures to
correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the
screening services." Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
42. Necessary treatments must be covered if they are among those listed in 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(r)(5) "whether or not such services are covered under the State plan."
43. Treatments must be covered if they "correct, compensate for, or improve a condition,
or prevent a condition from worsening--even if the condition cannot be prevented or cured."
Perkins, EPSDT Reference Manual at 6 (cited in note 39).
44. 58 Fed. Reg. 51291 (1993). See Hinds v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee, Slip
Op. 3:95-0508 at 17 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
45. The state may also limit EPSDT treatments to the most economical mode through
which it can offer services. In addition, the state may cover only those treatments which are
medically necessary. Perkins, EPSDT Reference Manual at 7 (cited in note 39). Medical
necessity as a limiting factor is discussed in Part JII.B.2.
46. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6403, 103 Stat. 2106, 2262.64, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396d(r)
(1994 ed.). For a description of the act, see Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last.- The
Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 Am. J. L. & Med. 97, 113 (1992). Rosenbaum points out that
while the preventive purpose of EPSDT is best known, an equally important purpose is assuring
maximum access to medically necessary health care. Id. at 115.
47. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (stating that the necessary treatment services must
be covered "whether or not such services are covered under the state plan"), with Rosenbaum
and Johnson, 64 Milbank Q. at 454 (cited in note 38) (stating that, in 1986-before the
OBRA-EPSDT treatment options were limited to the services the state offered). See also
Rosenbaum, 18 Am. J. L. & Med. at 101 (cited in note 46) (citing OBRA as a "major expansion of
the EPSDT program").
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25) (listing any other medical or remedial care recognized
under state law and specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as a Medicaid-
reimbursable service); 42 C.F.R. § 440.170 (specifying transportation services that are necessary
to secure medical examinations and treatment).
49. Jane Perkins and Lourdes A. Rivera, EPSDT and Managed Care: Do Plans Know
What They Are Getting Into?, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. 1248, 1255 (Mar. 1995) (noting that case
management is a mandatory EPSDT service).
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utilization.50 Finally, in order to reap the benefits of the EPSDT, a
state must inform all children eligible for Medicaid that EPSDT
services are available.51
Assessments and screening for the treatment of mental illness
traditionally have been weak areas of the EPSDT program. 52 Reasons
for the lack of mental health screening reportedly include confusion
about what type of screening to perform, primary care physicians'
inadequate training for mental health evaluations, and insensitivity
to low-income children's mental stress. 53
Within the managed care environment, the EPSDT program as
a whole can often be overlooked or greatly minimized in the rush to
control spending.5 4 Many managed care providers are not accustomed
to dealing with the EPSDT's undefined benefits package. 55 Often,
managed care providers are misled about the costs of the EPSDT for
purposes of calculating capitation rates because historical reporting
data is insufficient.56 Thus, in the contract with the MCO, specificity
and clarity regarding the EPSDT's broad mandates become critical
tools for furthering the goals of the EPSDT.57
As states move away from the traditional Medicaid programs,
they move into contractual relationships that form the basis of
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(D), 1398d(r)(5).
51. Perkins, EPSDT Reference Manual at 2 (cited in note 39). Congress intended the
state's notification efforts to be aggressive. See 135 Cong. Rec. S13234 (Oct. 12, 1989). See also
Bond v. Stanton, 504 F.2d 1246, 1251 (7th Cir. 1974) (pointing out that EPSDT programs must
be brought to the recipient, as the recipient will not likely go to get the services until it is too
late to achieve the congressional purposes of prevention and treatment).
52. Perkins, EPSDT Reference Manual at 3-4 (cited in note 39).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 9-10. But see Some Lessons Emerge on Managed Care, But Impact on Quality
Still Uncertain, 4 Health Care Pol. Rep. 1891 (Dec. 9, 1996) (finding that Wisconsin has had a
"substantially better record" of providing EPSDT services under their managed care program
than under a fee-for-service program). See also Gary Taylor, Settlements Seen Boosting Kids
Health Programs, Nat'l L. J. A9 (Aug. 28, 1995) (stating that ensuring that the EPSDT is not
lost to managed care in the shuffle is the next line of work for EPSDT advocates).
55. Children, AIDS Patients, and the Future of the Safety Net, Medicine & Health
(available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, CURNWS file) (March 18, 1996).
56. Terry Savela, Calculating Physician Capitation Rates: Advice for Medicaid Managed
Care Plans, 6 Managed Care Week (May 20, 1996). By the state's own admission, Tennessee's
calculations for the amount of service historically given are unreliable. See Tennessee's Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment Annual Report for the Reporting Period Oct.
1, 1993-Sept. 30, 1995, in Letter to the Health Care Financing Administration from the Bureau
of TennCare (Oct. 28, 1996) (on file with the Author) (EPSDT Annual Report") (stating that the
"uniqueness" of Tennessee's situation results in a need to repair the gaps in the EPSDT
reporting).
57. Savela, 6 Managed Care Week (cited in note 56). See also note 39 and accompanying
text (stating the goals of the EPSDT).
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managed health care.58 Under traditional Medicaid plans, states were
"sovereigns" and could write the rules for exactly how doctors offered
Medicaid services.59 In the contract-based relationship that exists in
managed care, however, a state may not be able to enforce terms
against the managed care organization that the parties did not spell
out explicitly in advance. 60 Because the state itself may be liable for
providing Medicaid benefits that are not explicitly included in the
health plan contract, 61 specific terms and definitions of covered
benefits become very important.
A. Judicially Enforcing the EPSDT
If a state's managed care contract does not require the MCO to
provide EPSDT services, people may turn to the courts for
enforcement. If a court mandates such a broad and expensive
program, the state will either finance the shortfalls of the program62
or, perhaps, share the expenses with an MCO. An MCO may or may
not have calculated for such expenses in the contract-negotiating
process. 63 Since the OBRA strengthened the EPSDT in 1989, class
action suits on behalf of children who did not receive their EPSDT
benefits increasingly have forced several states to step up their
EPSDT spending.64
A recent case in the District of Columbia demonstrates the
courts' role in enforcing the EPSDT as states have moved to managed
care programs.65 In Salazar v. District of Columbia,66 the federal
district court found that the District of Columbia's managed care
program violated federal law because the program failed to implement
fully the federal requirements for the EPSDT.67 The District had
lagged behind HCFA screening goals by eleven to twenty-eight
58. The Art of the Deal, 50 Medicine & Health (Oct. 14, 1996) (available on LEXIS, NEXIS
library, CURNWS file).
59. See Part VI.
60. The Art of the Deal, 50 Medicine & Health (cited in note 58).
61. Id.
62. The state's incremental costs will come in addition to the capitated rates already paid
to the MCOs.
63. The Art of the Deal, 50 Medicine & Health (cited in note 58).
64. Savela, 6 Managed Care Week at A9 (cited in note 56) (outlining settlements on behalf
of Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia for failing to fully implement their EPSDT program).
65. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 938 F. Supp. 926, 928-83 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that
recipients could seek reimbursment for medical payments because the city failed to comply with
EPSDT requirements).
66. 938 F. Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1996).
67. Id. at 980. The system failed to "operate efficiently, economically, and in accordance
with federal law." Id. at 931.
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percent in the years leading up to the suit.68 The MCO contract
mentioned the EPSDT, but the contract did not require the MCO to
screen Medicaid children as frequently as required by the District's
periodicity schedule.69  In sum, the court found the number of
shortcomings in the EPSDT program sufficient to impose liability on
the District under a standard of a "persistent, pervasive practice,
attributable to a course deliberately pursued by official
policymakers."70 Because the District did not carefully monitor and
ensure that the MCOs were fulflling their EPSDT duties, 71 the
Salazar court found the District liable for violating the Medicaid Act
in the presence of a managed care contract outlining only general
EPSDT coverage. 72
B. Proactive Planning for the EPSDT: Incentives for Screening and
the Need for Congressional Clarification
Without proper planning the EPSDT program can be an
expense that limits the savings a capitated system creates. Whether
a state remains liable for insufficient levels of EPSDT performance as
it did in Salazar or whether the EPSDT clauses of the managed care
contract are sufficient to create joint liability between the state and
the MCO, civil lawsuits could undermine managed care's cost-cutting
goals.73
In the managed mental health care realm, the concern over a
benefits package as broad as the EPSDT can be even greater, particu-
larly if the MCO relies on incomplete data from the state for past
68. Id. at 953.
69. Id. at 957. A periodicity schedule outlines a state's (or in this case, the Districts)
yearly requirements for performing screenings under the EPSDT. Id.
70. Id. at 972. Such shortcomings included failure to monitor screenings, failure to
perform screenings according to periodic schedules, and failure to collect data on EPSDT
treatment. Id. at 981.
71. Id. at 977-79.
72. Id. at 973. The District's contract with the MCO only generally outlined the EPSDT
and its requirements. Id.
73. Paul Grimaldi, Navigating the Waters of Medicaid Managed Care Contracting, 49
Healthcare Financial Management 72, 75 (June 1995) (describing desired economic effects of
managed health care). Grimaldi points out that managed care providers often misunderstand
the EPSDT, and that unexpected costs, in addition to other Medicaid mandates, could over-
whelm the per-person, per-month managed care savings, causing aggregate Medicaid spending
to rise. Id. at 72, 74. Medicaid managed care companies are paid on a per-person, per-month
capitated rate. Id. at 76. A company is at risk for any care an enrollee may require above the
capitated rate. Thus, a program like the EPSDT, with practically unlimited benefits, could limit
the profitability of an MCO, particularly if such capitated rates are calculated too low because of
insufficient information about the costs of the EPSDT, eventually causing the company's rates
to rise. Id. at 74, 77, 80.
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expenditures in computing capitation rates.74 In addition, MCOs may
fear that mental health care is more costly because of the perceived,
chronic nature of mental illness.75 Although much of that stigma may
be unwarranted, compared to physical care, mental health care within
a capitated rate structure remains an area of relatively uncertain
risks.76 As a result, a broad and fairly unlimited benefit program like
the EPSDT, if fully enforced, may substantially increase expenses
within mental health care77 unless the state and the MCO implement
plans to ensure realization of the EPSDT's goals within a cost-saving
and cost-efficient capitated health care system.
A section 1115 waiver allows a state to attempt to save on
health care expenditures while expanding coverage through managed
care programs. 78 Even after the attainment of a waiver, however, the
federal government often still requires that the state adhere to the
non-waived Medicaid mandates, including the EPSDT's broad benefits
of screening and treatment services. 79 The EPSDT's offer of nearly
universal access to treatment clearly conflicts with managed
Medicaid's promised cost-saving efforts.80 Reconciling them requires
two steps. First, states must understand and prepare for the EPSDT
when structuring an MCO's contract. To ensure that they satisfy the
74. See EPSDT Annual Report (cited in note 56) (stating that gaps in the EPSDT data
need to be found and repaired).
75. This stigma has been characterized as fear of the four "uns" of mental
health-undefinable, untreatable, unpredicatable, and unmanageable. David A. Pollack, et al.,
Prioritization of Mental Health Services in Oregon, 72 Milbank Q. 515, 516 (1994) (discussing
perceived problems in providing mental health care). While most experts tend to disregard such
stigmas, covering mental health care in a capitated environment is a riskier proposition. The
relative lack of proof of the effectiveness of mental health treatments, plus disagreement within
the mental health community as to the effectiveness of varying treatments illustrate the risk.
See Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 440 (cited in note 2) (discussing the lack of agreement, even
among health care advocates, regarding the effectiveness of certain treatments).
76. For a discussion of mental health's uncertain costs, see Part N.B.
77. Several studies have shown that, over time, the EPSDT actually generates savings on
health care costs. See note 39 and accompanying text. This Note, however, focuses more on the
situations present in many states where either a managed care company has entered into an
agreement and a capitated rate with incomplete knowledge of the EPSDT's broad mandates or a
state has been suddenly forced to comply with increased EPSDT expenses after converting to
managed care. See, for example, Salazar, 938 F. Supp. at 926 (requiring the District of
Columbia to adhere to EPSDT goals after converting to managed care). See also Perkins and
Rivera, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. at 1251 (cited in note 49) (noting that "the responsibility for
assuming the EPSDT is often not clearly defined in the managed care rules and contracts").
This situation is particularly germane as advocates seize on the EPSDT as a way to circumvent
managed care's rationing.
78. Perkins and Rivera, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. at 1249 (cited in note 49).
79. See Scheiber Letter (cited in note 36).
80. Moreover, particularly in the short term, if screenings were to increase to expected
levels (80%), increased costs from the resulting treatments would certainly strain a managed
care system that was not designed with high EPSDT participation in mind.
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preventive thrust of the EPSDT program, states should create an
incentive in the MCO's contract that encourages screenings instead of
waiting for a court to enforce the EPSDT. Second, Congress must
allow states that seek waivers to effectively apply their definitions of
"medically necessary" as a discretionary tool for the treatments
provided under the EPSDT.
1. The Carrot and Stick Approach to Screening
Because managed care programs employ "gatekeeping" pri-
mary care providers,sl an enrollee in a managed care system often has
more frequent contact with a single primary physician than in a fee-
for-service environment.8 2  This increased contact offers more
opportunities to perform EPSDT screenings. Even with the increased
contact, however, states employing managed care systems continue to
lag behind federal screening targets. 3  Because the standard ap-
proach of referencing the EPSDT in managed care contracts has not
succeeded in increasing the number of screenings, s4 waiver states
should consider setting up an incentive program to encourage the
required screenings.
In the United Kingdom, public health authorities faced
difficulties implementing an immunization program. In response to
low immunization rates, the government instituted a program of fi-
nancial incentives to primary care physicians who met the ninety
percent immunization rate the government set as a goal.85 Similarly,
to control enforcement of the EPSDT in a managed care environment
81. A gatekeeper may be a primary care physician or another specialist to whom a defined
population is assigned. The gatekeeper is required either to supply all the health care to that
population or to decide that that patient can see another specialist. Patterson and Sharfstein,
The Future of Mental Health Care, in Feldman and Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health
Care at 406 (cited in note 6).
82. Thomas E. Bottker, The Emergence of Prepaid Psychiatry, in Judith L. Feldman and
Richard J. Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care 8 (American Psychiatric Press, 1992)
(stating that one study found there are three times as many outpatient visits per thousand
members in a capitated rate program than a fee-for-service program).
83. See Scheiber Letter (cited in note 36) (citing the low rate of EPSDT screening in
TennCare).
84. Id. See also Salazar, 938 F. Supp. at 953 (declaring that in the two years of the
District of Columbia's managed care program-1994 and 1995--the District's participation in
the EPSDT was well below the HCFA's 80% screening goal).
85. The government program offered a $4,000 bonus to every physician who immunized
90% of the children on that physician's "eligibility list." See Richard H. Nicholson, UK Moves
Toward Compulsory Vaccination, 6 Hastings Center Rep. 4, 4 (Mar./Apr. 1996). The program
also included a mandatory immunization campaign which has been criticized for forcing
immunization on children. Others argue that a voluntary immunization program is simply
more effective. The program is successful enough, however, that several Canadian provinces
since have duplicated it. Id.
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without the threat of an injunction, 6 a state could institute a program
of financial incentives for providers or managed care organizations 87
in order to increase EPSDT screenings.8 Ideally, the cost of such an
incentive program would be offset by lower capitated rates. Lowering
the capitated rates would allow states to use the money previously
allocated for the higher capitated rates to fund an incentive program.
The "reduction" in the capitated rate would be returned to the MCO
for its physicians' performance of the federally mandated screenings.
A state needs the incentive program in addition to clear con-
tractual language concerning the EPSDT requirements because courts
may continue to hold a state liable for providers' failure to implement
mandated Medicaid programs.8 9 A court theoretically could impose
joint liability if contracts were clear on the EPSDT requirements, but,
86. There is some debate as to whether a court is the most effective regulator in public
law litigation because the nature of a coures decision is fashioned on such broad remedial lines
that it takes on a legislative effect. Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529, 530-31, 533 (E.D. Pa.
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 1996) (warning that consent decrees often go
beyond the minimum required by law and into a gray area better left to the politically
accountable branches of government). Such questions are particularly difficult when the
plaintiffs are advocates for the same people the defendant governmental unit is supposed to
serve. Knowing that a court will fashion a remedy that may encourage a defendant department
to acquiesce in litigation to get an increased budget by way of a court order instead of through
the political process. See James F. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental
Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 231, 302 (Autumn 1976)
(arguing that courts, not constrained by a budget, will often be more receptive to the "needs" of
a governmental program).
87. While most cost reduction efforts are targeted at the more easily regulated MCO
because they are more easily regulated, it is also possible to target physicians themselves. See
Hall, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 483 (cited in note 3) (stating that a financial incentive program
targeting physicians is a workable method for cost containment). See also Savela, 6 Managed
Care Week (cited in note 56) (positing that mangaged medical physician contracts must tie
reimbursment to key performance requirements to ensure that state regulations are met).
88. The suggested contract language already includes punitive measures for failing to
meet minimum EPSDT levels. See Sample Contract Language for EPSDT, 2 Managed
Medicare & Medicaid (Oct. 21, 1996) (available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, CURNWS file).
Whether to prod or to entice is an eternal debate of motivational techniques that is beyond the
scope of this Note. Some authorities believe financial incentives excessively encouraging
physicians to conserve resources will not work in the medical realm because the professional
nature of the field requires a doctor to react to non-economic stimuli-namely the patient's
needs. Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of
Interest?, 317 New Eng. J. Med. 1743, 1748 (1987). Those commentators, however, tend to focus
on incentives to withhold services. David Mechanic, Models of Rationing: Professional
Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1713, 1748 (1992) (advocating
prohibition of physician payment arrangements that alter "medical decision-making by
providing economic incentives to withhold services"). A financial incentive to screen children as
a preventive measure should not be as troublesome.
89. Ultimately though, the state will probably remain liable. In J.K., by and through R.K.
v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Ariz. 1993), the court said that it is "patently unreasonable"
to presume that Congress would allow a state to disclaim federal liability for Medicaid programs
by contracting its responsibilities to a private MCO.
1997] MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAID, AND THE EPSDT 697
ultimately, the court will look to the state for implementation.90 Thus,
the more the state can do to ensure that the MCO meets EPSDT
requirements, the less likely it is that the state will have to pay twice
to fulfil the EPSDT mandate-once to an MCO in the capitated fee
payments and again to satisfy a judicial order when the MCO fails to
perform the EPSDT requirements.
2. Congressional Clarification of "Medically Necessary"
as a Way to Limit the EPSDT in the
Managed Mental Health Care Environment
Irrespective of the course a state takes to increase screenings, 91
the EPSDT's requirement that "necessary" treatment be supplied for
any condition found in the screening process will result in higher
costs.
Within the EPSDT, the states have no specific authority to
limit the allocation of services once a doctor determines the services
are necessary to treat an illness discovered in a screening.9 2 Before
OBRA, the EPSDT essentially required that states provide children
under twenty-one with all necessary services that the state plan of-
fered.9 3 With the amendments to OBRA, however, Congress expanded
the EPSDT to provide coverage for any service Medicaid covers94 that
90. Id. See also Salazar, 938 F. Supp. at 978 (finding the District of Columbia's failure to
oversee the provider in meeting the EPSDT screening requirements resulted in a violation of
Medicaid regulations).
91. As discussed above, a state may choose to implement a proactive incentive program to
increase screenings, or a state may be forced to react to a judicial mandate to increase screen-
ings. See Part III.B.1.
92. The courts are very deferential to doctors' determinations of medical necessity. Often
a state's only defense to a doctor's decision of medical necessity is to claim that the treatment is
"experimental" Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that a medi-
cally established doctrine permits a Medicaid-participating state to refuse to pay for experimen-
tal procedures). For example, a body of precedent has developed around a state's refusal to pay
for a doctor's request for experimental organ transplants to ameliorate conditions discovered in
EPSDT screenings. For an overview, see C. David Flower, Note, State Discretion in Funding
Organ Transplants Under the Medicaid Program: Interpretive Guidelines in Determining the
Scope of Mandated Coverage, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1233, 1246-54 (1995) (outlining a split in federal
courts of appeals as to the "extent to which the Medicaid statute requires states to fund organ
transplants"). In Tennessee, a federal district court required Medicaid payment under
TennCare when a doctor determined that an arguably experimental organ transplant was
medically necessary to treat a condition found in EPSDT screening. Although funding of organ
transplants is discretionary in Medicaid, the court said that anything found to be "medically
necessary" must be covered. Hinds, Slip. Op. 3:95-0508 at 9. The court found that the doctor's
determination of medical necessity under the EPSDT transcends whether the state had
previously chosen not to fund the transplant. Id. at 19.
93. Rosenbaum and Johnson, 64 Milbank Q. at 454 (cited in note 38).
94. The services that states must provide under the Medicaid are listed in 42 U.S.C. §
1936(13)(B).
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is deemed "medically necessary."95 In enacting OBRA's expansion of
the EPSDT's coverage, Congress stated that "in implementing this
provision, states may utilize prior authorization and other limitations
related to ensuring that all care and treatment is medically
necessary."96 Traditionally under Medicaid, states have had the right
to set appropriate limits on the Medicaid services offered by defining
what services are "medically necessary."97
IV. THE STATES' TRADITIONAL RIGHT TO DEFINE "MEDICALLY
NECESSARY" FOR MEDICAID
The Supreme Court stated in oft-quoted dicta that a "medically
necessary" standard is an acceptable one for regulating Medicaid
benefits as long as the definition still allows a state to meet
Medicaid's objective of furnishing, as far as practical, medical assis-
tance to the poor.98 The Court explained that "it is hardly inconsistent
with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnec-
essary-though perhaps desirable-medical services"99 by defining
what is medically necessary.
Some courts have found two levels of medical necessity inher-
ent in the Medicaid statute.100 First, the state decides which services
are "medically necessary," and Medicaid covers those services. 101
Second, the physician then determines which treatments are medi-
95. 135 Cong. Rec. at 13057.
96. Id. Prior authorization requires a provider to justify delivering a particular service
before providing it if the provider desires reimbursement. Authorization for the service is given
either by an MCO or by a third party monitor. Patterson and Sharfstein, The Future of Mental
Health Care, in Feldman and Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care at 409 (cited in
note 6).
97. Medicaid regulations permit state limitations based upon the degree of medical ne-
cessity. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (stating that a state cannot deny benefits based on a diagnosis
but that appropriate limits may be based on such criteria as "medical necessity"). But see
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980) (deciding that determining medical neces-
sity is not the job of the government but of the individual physician).
98. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 435, 444 (1977) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(C) (1970 ed., Supp.
V)). See also Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 547 (stating that the medical necessity standard is not in the
Medicaid statute but that it has "become judicially accepted as implicit to the legislative scheme
and is apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court') (citing Beal, 432 U.S. at 444-45 n.9).
99. Beal, 432 U.S. at 444-45.
100. Cowan v. Myers, 187 Cal. App. 3d 968, 978 (1986).
101. Id. In California, the definition of "medically necessary" services includes those serv-
ices "reasonable and necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disabil-
ity, or to alleviate severe pain through diagnosis or treatment of disease, illness, or injury which
require preventative health services of treatment to prevent serious deterioration of health." Id.
at 982 (citing 22 Ca. Admin. Code § 51303(a)). The court found that this definition was not too
restrictive for the purposes of the Medicaid Act. Id. at 978.
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cally necessary for a particular diagnosis.102 The federal Medicaid Act
permits the state to have discretion in defining the first of the two
levels.1o3 In other words, a state may properly decide what services
are necessary, leaving a physician to determine what treatments are
necessary. 104 When making the decision about what services will be
covered under the Medicaid plan, a state cannot eliminate specific
treatments on the basis of the underlying medical condition.1 5 For
example, the courts have held that when a state decides "medically
necessary" includes the general services of surgery, it cannot then
exclude a sex reassignment surgery for purposes of curing transsex-
uality. 06 If a doctor determines that such surgery is the only
treatment for the condition of transsexualism, thus finding the
surgery to be "necessary," the state cannot interfere with that
determination. 107
A. 'Medically Necessary" and the EPSDT
Under the EPSDT, however, Congress seemingly took away
the states' traditional method of limitation. After first stating that
states could use controls such as "prior authorizations and other limi-
tations" to determine what services are "medically necessary,"0e
Congress went on to specify that any such limitations could not inter-
fere with the EPSDT's objectives of identifying and correcting prob-
lems before they become serious. 0 9 This creates a contradiction. A
state has traditionally been free to define the scope of its Medicaid
102. Id.
103. Id. at 976. Changing the doctor's role as the sole arbiter of a patient's needs is not
without precedent. With the doctrine of informed consent, the doctor's power to decide "what is
best' for the patient shifted from the doctor to the patient. John Petrilla, Ethics, Money and the
Problem of Coercion in Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. 359, 359 (1996).
In addition, by introducing a third party, the MCO, into the physician's traditional diagnosis,
the very nature of managed health care demands that the doctor consider financial implications
of treatment options. Id. at 361.
104. Cowan, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 978. See also Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 125
(1st Cir. 1979) (reading the Supreme Courts dicta in Beal, 432 U.S at 438, to indicate that there
are two levels of judgment as to medical necessity in the statutory scheme of Medicaid, a macro-
level decision of the legislature and a micro-level decision of the physician). But see Pinneke,
623 F.2d at 550 ("The decision of whether or not certain treatment or a particular type of
surgery is medically necessary rests with the individual recipient's physician and not with
clerical personnel or government officials").
105. Cowan, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 980 (quoting Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 652 (5th Cir.
1980)).
106. See, for example, id. at 977-78.
107. Id. (interpreting Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 550).
108. 135 Cong. Rec. at 13234.
109. Id.
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services by defining which services are "medically necessary."11O
Furthermore, in a guide for integrating the EPSDT into managed care
systems, HCFA indicated that a state should clearly define "medically
necessary" for an MCO."' Yet, as previously outlined, that definition
cannot effectively limit the broad treatment options available under
the EPSDT.112 Thus, on a practical level, controlling costs with a clear
definition of what the state considers "medically necessary" is not
feasible without conflicting with the comprehensive treatment options
available under the EPSDT.
For example, the EPSDT states that any treatment that
"corrects or ameliorates" a mental condition discovered in a screening
must be covered. 113 Thus, when a doctor or provider decides that a
specified treatment is required to "ameliorate" a mental deficiency
and the MCO, in turn, assesses whether that treatment is medically
necessary, neither the MCO nor the doctor can effectively consider the
definition of "medically necessary" found in the MCO contract if that
definition at all restricts the "preventative purposes" of the EPSDT.
As previously noted, the EPSDT's treatment options have been
expanded to include most federally-recognized treatments."4 Thus,
although Congress stated that states could use "other limitations" to
ensure that only medically necessary treatments are covered under
the EPSDT,"1 the breadth of the statutory language renders the
states' ability to define "medically necessary"-one of the states' most
important cost-allocation tools-powerless to contain mental health
care expenditures in the face of the EPSDT.
As a result, in a managed care environment, when a state de-
fines in its contract which services will be considered "medically
necessary," that definition essentially will be disregarded for purposes
of the EPSDT. The EPSDT takes away a state's traditional ability to
define "medically necessary" to control its Medicaid services.
Furthermore, it delegates that discretion to the provider, who can
then force the state to pay for any "items and services allowed under
110. Rush, 625 F.2d at 1156 ("[A] state may establish standards for individual physicians to
use in determining what services are appropriate in a particular case." (citing Beal, 432 U.S. at
438)). The state's responsibility extends at least to the shaping of a reasonable definition of
medical necessity. Id.
111. Office of Managed Care and Medicaid Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration,
Integrating EPSDT and Medicaid Managed Care Strategies for States and Managed Care
Plans 9 ('Integrating EPSDT') (on file with the Author).
112. See Part III.B.2.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
114. 135 Cong. Rec. 13234.
115. Id.
700 [Vol. 50:683
1997] MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAMD, AND THE EPSDT 701
federal law."116 Any challenge to the provider's decision by the MCO
would be moot, as the provider need only claim that the particular
treatment sought somehow "ameliorates" the condition.117  The
provider's absolute control neutralizes managed care's mechanism for
controlling costs, that is, the presence of a third party that monitors
the delivery of health services.118 Therefore, if fully implemented, the
EPSDT becomes an "escape hatch" for the necessary rationing that
comes with managed care. As providers and enrollees discover and
utilize this "escape hatch," the costs of providing such a broad array of
treatments will threaten the ability of states to use managed care to
control debilitating health care costs.
The only limiting factors that HCFA has recognized as possible
limits on the EPSDT appear to be prior authorization,1 and perhaps
peer review. 20  In peer review, practicing physicians or other
professionals evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of treatments
ordered or performed by other physicians to decide if the treatments
are indeed "medically necessary."121 Peer review, however, runs into
the same problem because without a limiting definition of "medically
necessary" to serve as a reference for the peer evaluation, the breadth
of the EPSDT ensures that the providers will remain the ultimate
arbiters of what services are medically necessary.
B. 'Medically Necessary," the EPSDT, and Managed
Mental Health Care
Within the context of managed mental health care, the
EPSDT's array of treatment options, constrained only by a doctor's
determination of necessity, could become an expensive proposition,
and conflict with the cost-saving goals of managed Medicaid mental
health care. Defining the criteria for "medically necessary" services is
a particularly important method for controlling costs in the managed
116. Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(r).
118. Randall, et al., 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1130 (cited in note 5) (stating that with
utilization review, like capitated programs, the third party payor primarily determines
appropriate services, refusing to pay for what they determine inappropriate).
119. Congress mentioned prior authorization when passing the OBRA. See 135 Cong. Rec.
at 13234. See note 96.
120. The HCFA outlined peer review in the aforementioned guide to managed care, and
Congress provided for prior authorization in the EPSDT. Integrating EPSDT at 11 (cited in
note 111).
121. Patterson and Sharfstein, The Future of Mental Health Care, in Feldman and
Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care at 408 (cited in note 6).
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mental health care environment. 12 2 In mental health care, however,
experts often disagree about what constitutes a standard course of
treatment or even a good outcome. This lack of consensus has made
deciding what is "medically necessary" difficult for managed mental
healthcare organizations and providers.123 The absence of a clear
definition of success in mental treatment often results in inflated
costs for the MC0124 and would undoubtedly lead to even higher costs
under a strictly enforced EPSDT system. The state and its MCOs
cannot rely on a contractual definition of "medically necessary" to
allocate services because they are effectively required to defer to the
provider's determination of necessary services. 25  In effect, the
EPSDT forces a return to the fee-for-service system of nearly
unquestioned reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid
children under twenty-one years of age. This system necessarily
clashes with managed care's goal of cost reduction and, if the EPSDT
were fully enforced, might result in the same cost increases states
experienced under Medicaid's fee-for-service plans. 26
The states' power to delineate criteria for medically necessary
services is the key to managing both the broad EPSDT mandate and
the managed mental health care costs. To ensure that states seeking
a section 1115 waiver meet both the requirements of the EPSDT and
the goals of a capitated mental health program,' 27 Congress must re-
turn to the waiver states the ability to use "medically necessary" as a
factor to limit the EPSDT.
C. The Options for 'Medically Necessary" in Managed
Mental Health Care
If Congress allowed a state to actually apply its definition of
"medically necessary" to the EPSDT, the process of defining
"medically necessary" in the managed care contract would become
122. James E. Sabin and Norman Daniels, Determining 'Medical Necessity" in Mental
Health Practice, 24 Hastings Center Rep. 5 (Nov.IDec. 1994). Many insurance companies feel
that judgments about medical necessity in mental health are much less precise than judgments
in physical health. Thus, cost controls require a clear understanding of what the provider
considers necessary. Id.
123. Petrilla, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 391-92 (cited in note 103).
124. Id. The American Psychiatric Association recently developed guidelines for mental
health treatment for some major depressive disorders. Some supporters have advocated the use
of these guidelines as a standard in acceptable mental health care treatment. Id. at 403.
125. See Part WV.A.
126. For a fuller discussion, see Part II.
127. See Part III (discussing requirements of the EPSDT); Part II (discussing the goals of a
capitated mental health care program).
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even more critical. Because the definition of effective treatment in
mental health care is often not as clear as in physical health care, any
definition of what services are considered "medically necessary"
requires close scrutiny of the state's goals for its Medicaid managed
mental health care coverage.
Three models describe the options for defining "medically
necessary" in the managed mental health care realm: the normal
function model, the capability model, and the welfare model.128 Each
model focuses on the role that managed health care insurance plays in
treating illness.129 Of the three models, the normal function model
offers the fairest, most administerable, and most affordable model for
defining "medically necessary" within managed Medicaid mental
health care.1 30
The normal function model stresses that the central purpose of
mental health care should be to maintain, to restore, or to compensate
for the restricted opportunity caused by a disease or disability.131
Thus, mental health care coverage should have as its goal the restora-
tion of a person to the level he would have achieved without the
conditions caused by a diagnosable mental disorder. 3 - For example,
the normal function model recognizes that in the "natural lottery" of
life, some people are simply socially inept or shy in ways that may
cause suffering.133 Only those with medically defined deviations un-
derlying their disorders, however, require treatment at the cost of the
mental health care system. 34 The goal of the normal function model,
128. Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 10-11 (cited in note 122).
129. Id. The authors explain that defining medical necessity as a method for financing and
setting mental health coverage priorities necessitates examination of the goals of the coverage.
Id. at 12.
130. Id. at 11 (asserting that the normal function model allows society to "draw a plausible
boundary around the potential scope of insurance coverage for mental health care").
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id.
133. While these people deserve compassion, the normal function model recognizes that the
health care system is not the only avenue open to them. It expects that other social institutions
such as churches, schools, and families will work with such individuals to help them overcome
their problems. Id.
134. Id. at 11. The underlying deviations are suggested to be those deviations listed as a
disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Id. at 12. The official
nomenclature of the 'DSM-IV" is based on defined criteria for classifying mental disorders. Id.
at 12.
A system in which necessity depends on the diagnosis of an underlying illness is not without
its detractors. See David Mechanic, Mental Health Services in the Context of Health Insurance
Reform, 71 Milbank Q. 349 (1993) (calling it unethical to require an underlying defined illness
because the list of "defined" illnesses is itself somewhat arbitrary). Additionally, the
requirement of a diagnosable illness might be too limiting, as psychotherapy is arguably the
only treatment needing a system of controls (like an escalating co-payment) because it is
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then, is to align coverage with the common meaning of the term
"medically necessary." Taken at its common meaning, a medically
necessary activity is one essential to improving or curing a disease, 13
or to decreasing the impact of a disease or disability.136
In comparison, the capability model mandates that the goal of
mental health care should be to give people equal personal capabili-
ties. The model encourages giving people with diminished capabilities
the priority of treatment, regardless of the underlying causes of their
difficulties. 137 Such a model would define a treatment as "medically
necessary" if it would help the patient become an equal competitor in
life without requiring a diagnosable underlying disease. 138  The
capability model has a broader goal for managed mental health care
than simply treating disease; it seeks to enhance mental
performance.139
Finally, if the patient suffers because of attitudes or behaviors
that the patient did not choose to develop and could not have over-
come independently, the welfare model would include treatment for
those attitudes and behaviors as necessary. 40 As the most expansive
model, the welfare model seeks to enhance the patient's potential for
happiness.' 4 ' Instead of an underlying mental disease or an unequal
lot in life, the welfare model requires only "present distress" as
sufficient mental incapacity to warrant coverage for attendant
medical necessities. 42 The welfare model strives to alleviate almost
all disadvantages and reduce suffering.13
particularly susceptible to the dangers of"moral hazards." Id. at 350. A "moral hazard" is the
overuse of a benefit because of the lack of constraints on the benefit. Id.
135. William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical Necessity, 22 Psychiatric Annals 362, 362
(1992).
136. Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 5. (cited in note 122).
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
139. For example, the capability model would advocate that a short child who was free of
any growth hormone abnormality should nonetheless receive growth hormones because short
stature can be a mentally handicapping condition to some people. Id. The normal function
model, however, would not cover hormone treatment for short children unless they had an
underlying deficiency in growth hormones. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 10.
143. For example, a child who is shy as a result of a bipolar disorder would be covered
under the normal function model, but if the child were simply shy because of his disposition, the
normal function model would not allow the child to be covered. Id. at 11. However, because the
welfare model seeks to reduce suffering caused by mental conditions that the child may not
have independently chosen, treatment of the shyness would qualify as medically necessary
under the welfare model. Id.
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A definition based on requiring an underlying disease, as the
normal function is, is not without complications. For example, in the
field of psychiatry and chemical dependency treatment, there are no
standard, external "biological validators" of psychiatric and chemical
dependency illnesses, and there are few controlled studies that
indicate the most efficacious treatments.'" Psychiatric professionals,
therefore, recommend that in the absence of a recognizable illness, the
definition of "medically necessary" should consider the degree to
which a person's behavior is a danger to himself, to others, or to
objects.' 45
When the presence of disease or the effectiveness of treatment
is not clear, collective values determine the outcome.'4 Thus, it is
critical that when a state defines what is "medically necessary," it
considers the opinions of doctors, health care professionals, and even
laypersons to understand what the community wants, as well as what
the community can afford.' 47
D. The Normal Function Model Definition of 'Medically Necessary" as
an Effective Restraint on the EPSDT
If a state adhered to the normal function model for its defini-
tion of "medically necessary," and, in turn, the state could effectively
apply such a definition to the EPSDT, a state could then take large
steps towards controlling the costs that will presumably result from
heightened screening. 48  As a tool for allocating resources, the
definition of "medically necessary" must recognize that resources are
limited and, particularly in the mental health care realm, cannot
necessarily cover all the benefits that the capability or welfare models
demand.
As the EPSDT presently stands,149 the requirement that a
state's definition of "medically necessary" not limit the "purposes" of
the EPSDT means that the EPSDT, in the mental health care realm,
has essentially adopted the welfare model. This becomes particularly
144. Glazer, 22 Psychiatric Annals at 362 (cited in note 135).
145. Id. at 364.
146. Id.
147. Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 453 (cited in note 2). The state of Oregon utilized such a
model when it implemented a managed care system that essentially prioritized managed mental
health care on a list of services that the system would cover. See generally Pollack,
MacFarland, George, and Angell, 72 Milbank Q. at 515 (cited in note 75).
148. See Part III.A (explaining that increased screening can result from judicial edict); Part
III.B.1 (outlining a financial incentive plan for increased screening).
149. This includes the 1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts amendments.
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clear when one considers that the statute itself offers treatment for
any condition that "correct[s] or ameliorate[s] defects.., and mental
illness."150 "Ameliorate" could be read broadly to include any action
that makes a condition better.151  Mental illness, without the
requirement of an underlying diagnosable disease, can also be defined
very broadly, particularly with the statute's vague reference to
correcting or ameliorating any "defect." 152 Essentially, then, the
EPSDT's purpose can be interpreted to require that a state improve
any mental defect found during the screening of a child, much like the
welfare model. Any state efforts to control costs by defining
"medically necessary" based on a model other than the welfare model
would necessarily be far more limiting than the pursuit of such an
expansive purpose.
Therefore, particularly in the managed mental health care
environment, Congress must take steps to allow a state to define
"medically necessary," and to allow a state to apply that definition to
the EPSDT effectively. As they currently read, HCFA guidelines for
integrating the EPSDT into managed care allow states to define what
is medically necessary,153 but the reality is that any application of that
definition within the EPSDT would conflict with the EPSDT itself and
thus be meaningless as a cost containment measure.15 4 Therefore, as
the EPSDT's screening requirements increasingly are enforced
through judicial edict or proactive planning, Congress must give the
states an effective mechanism to control the treatment costs resulting
from increased screenings. 55 To do so, Congress should allow states
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
151. Frederick C. Mish, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 78 (Merriam-Webster,
1990).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
153. Integrating EPSDTat 9 (cited in note 111).
154. See Part IV.A.
155. It is worth noting that President Clintoen's proposed Health Security Act of 1993 set
the level of insurance for his national health care plan for mental and substance abuse in accord
with the normal function model, stating that coverage would be provided if an individual has
had a "diagnosable mental disorder or a diagnostic substance abuse disorder." The Health
Security Act of 1993, H.R. No. 103-174, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Title I, Subtitle B, § 115(b)(1A).
See also Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 11 (cited in note 122). Therefore, if the
President recognized that a national program of managed mental health coverage required
defining "medically necessary" as requiring a diagnosable mental illness, then Congress must
also recognize the need to allow states to apply such a definition to the potentially expansive
EPSDT.
The definition of "medically necessary" does not end with the decision of whether to follow
the normal function model or another model for service standards. Because of the wide variety
of mental health care practitioners, one must also consider the credentials of reimbursable
providers, the settings for treatment, and the effectiveness or expected effectiveness of the
treatment. Glazer, 22 Psychiatric Annals at 363-65 (cited in note 135).
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to effectively apply their definitions of "medically necessary" to the
EPSDT.'5
V. THE "TENNCARE PARTNERS" MANAGED MEDICAID MENTAL HEALTH
CARE PROGRAM
Tennessee serves as a good example of a state that did not
completely plan for the EPSDT when moving to managed care. The
structure it chose to deliver mental health care and the contract it
signed with the mental health care suppliers, demonstrates the
confusion that can result when a state does not properly plan for the
EPSDT while moving to managed Medicaid mental health care.
Moreover, as a state that chose to deliver the mental health care
through a system separate from its physical care, Tennessee created a
separate definition of "medically necessary" for mental health, allow-
ing this definition to be analyzed within the aforementioned models
and demonstrating its applicability to the EPSDT.
Tennessee chose to deliver its managed health care system
through two entities, one for general health care and one for mental
health care. 157 This "carve-out" system is controversial. 158 Supporters
argue that carve-outs help overcome the concern that non-psychiatric
gatekeepers do not understand mental health issues and thus are
ineffective in diagnosing and treating mental illness. 5 9 Detractors
maintain that such a separation only creates confusion and
difficulties in getting treatment, in addition to dual administrative
costs. 60 It seems, however, that Tennessee chose a carve-out system
primarily to expedite the initial operation of TennCare's managed
mental health care system. 61
Under the Tennessee managed mental health care program,
TennCare Partners, two behavioral health organizations ("BHOs")
156. Id.
157. TennCare. A New Direction in Health Care (cited in note 28).
158. For a discussion of the two sides of the debate on the carve out of mental health care,
see Petrilla, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 369 n.22 (cited in note 103).
159. Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 446 (cited in note 2).
160. Petrilla, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 370 (cited in note 103).
161. Tammie Smith, Behavioral Health Back to TennCare, Tennessean 1A (Oct. 7, 1996).
Tennessee's TennCare program has been marked by a rush toward implementation. Only
months after receiving its waiver, Tennessee introduced TennCare. Though TennCare Partners
experienced some delays, it too was implemented in a matter of months after the waiver was
approved. Gordon Bonnyman, Status of TennCare-May 1996 <http://www.chcs.org/CHCS/gb_
may.htm> (visited Jan. 23, 1997).
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manage the mental health needs of the enrollees.162 The state pays
the BHOs a set monthly fee per enrollee to provide each enrollee's
mental health needs. 163 The TennCare Partners program offers two
levels of coverage, a "Basic Benefit Package" for all enrollees, which
places limits on most services, and an "Enhanced Benefit Package" for
enrollees with chronic mental health needs.164 The Enhanced Benefit
Package enrollee can receive all the benefits offered under the
TennCare Partners program without mandated limits, so long as the
benefit is "medically necessary."165 The Enhanced Benefit Package is
available to children who meet the state's definition of "seriously
emotionally disturbed"'166 and who are not in the legal custody of the
state.67
The TennCare Partners program has received mixed re-
views. 68 While the state maintains that the carve-out program has
been a success, it recently announced that the BHOs will integrate
162. These two BHOs are a consolidation of the five behavioral organizations that were
originally approved to offer services. The two organizations are Premier Behavioral Systems of
Tennessee and Tennessee's Behavioral Health. Bonnyman, Status of TennCare (cited in note
161).
163. Andy Sher, Mental Care Plan Could Trigger New State Trends, Add Controversies,
Nashville Banner A9 (June 28, 1996).
164. Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, TennCare Partners
Pamphlet, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Benefits (on file with the Author). For example,
the Basic Benefit Package limits inpatient facility services to thirty days per occasion and sixty
days per year per enrollee. Id. Inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment services
are limited to ten days' detox and a maximum lifetime limit of $30,000. Id. A few services,
however, like psychiatric pharmacy services and pharmacy-related lab services, are available for
the Basic Benefit enrollee "as medically necessary." Id.
165. For a discussion of what constitutes "medically necessary" under the TennCare
Partners program, see Part V.B.
166. The contract between the state and the BHO considers a child under eighteen years of
age "seriously emotionally disturbed" if he or she is diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder and a
Global Assessment of Functioning score of fifty or less in accordance with the DSM-IV. A
Provider Risk Contract Between the State of Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation and (Name of Contractor) 11-12 (Feb. 29, 1996) (on file with the Author) C'Provider
Risk Contract"). The DSM-IV is further discussed in note 134 and accompanying text.
167. Bonnyman, Status of TennCare (cited in note 161).
168. Community mental health centers have been particularly critical of the program.
These centers once received funding directly from the state but now must compete with other
mental health providers for contracts with the BHOs. With the advent of TennCare Partners,
the centers' state funding dropped from 55% to 20% of the total state budget for mental health
care. TennCare Carve Out off to Rocky Start in First 90 Days, 6 Mental Health Weekly 1, 2
(Oct. 7, 1996). In addition, Charles R. Blackburn, director of the Tennessee Association of
Mental Health Organizations, has testified that TennCare Partners is a failure for destroying
the service network provided by the community health centers instead of working with the
network to implement BHOs. Charles R. Blackburn, Testimony presented to the HJR 448
Mental Health Study Committee (Dec. 18, 1996) (on file with the Author). See also Tammie
Smith, Is TennCare Partners Working?, Tennessean 4B (Oct. 3, 1996) (stating that officials
claim TennCare Partners is running smoothly while providers complain of slow reimburse-
ment).
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back into the regular TennCare program by 1998.169 Administrative
savings from reducing the two delivery systems into one seem to be
the factor compelling the return to a carve-in program.
170
A. The EPSDT and the TennCare Partners Program
Under TennCare, Tennessee has not effectively met its EPSDT
mandates. Tennessee stated in its 1996 annual EPSDT report that
since the implementation of TennCare in 1994, it had screened eight
to fifteen percent of children eligible for screening, 171 while the HCFA
guidelines have a stated goal of eighty percent EPSDT participation
by 1995.172 The TennCare Partners program appears to be headed
toward similarly low EPSDT participation. 173 One reason seems to be
the confusion created by the two-tiered benefits scheme. The
Enhanced Benefit Package does not cap the services provided in the
Partners program if a doctor deems them "medically necessary."174
But a child must be deemed "seriously emotionally disturbed"' 175 to
receive the Enhanced Benefit Package. According to regulations, all
other children receive the Basic Benefit Package, which contains caps
on several services. 176 It is quite possible that the BHOs or the
providers could misinterpret the regulations and restrict children in
the Enhanced Benefit Package to the specific benefits listed in the
contract 177 or restrict the children in the Basic Benefit Package to the
caps placed on the benefits they receive. 78 In reality, the broad bene-
fits of the EPSDT require that any child be offered any federally rec-
ognized Medicaid treatment for a mental illness found in the screen-
ing process. 179
In addition to the confusing structure of the program itself, the
contract for the TennCare Partners program between the state and
the BHOs does not effectively convey the requirements of the EPSDT.
In the TennCare Partners program, the contract terms addressing the
EPSDT are vague and do not specify all of the elements that the
169. Tammie Smith, TennCare Arm to Disband, Tennessean 1E (Feb. 14, 1997).
170. Smith, Tennessean at 1A (cited in note 161).
171. EPSDT Annual Report (cited in note 56).
172. See Salazar, 938 F. Supp. at 952-53.
173. EPSDT Annual Report (cited in note 56).
174. See note 165 and accompanying text.
175. See note 166 and accompanying text.
176. Provider Risk Contract at 12 (cited in note 166). The caps for the Basic Benefit
Package include visit and dollar limits for certain mental health services. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Part HI.
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complex EPSDT mandate requires. 180 The EPSDT is mentioned only
twice in the hundred-page contract,""' and the two passages are
inconsistent. First, and most comprehensively, the contract states:
In accordance with EPSDT requirement, the Contractor shall provide
medically necessary services to children under the age of twenty-one (21) when
such services are required to correct or ameliorate mental illnesses and
conditions, whether or not such services are covered under the TennCare
Program State plan and without regard to any service limits otherwise
established in this Contract. This requirement shall be met either by direct
provision of the service by the contractor, or by referral in accordance with 42
C.F.R. 441.61.182
Second, the contract refers to the EPSDT in a footnote, reminding the
BHO that three particular services in the Basic Benefit Package are
unlimited when medically necessary.8 3 The conflict in these clauses
occurs because the first clause addresses the breadth of the EPSDT
by stating that all "medically necessary" treatments must be covered,
whether or not covered under the TennCare program, yet the second
clause implies that only the named benefits are unlimited if
"medically necessary." The first clause is closer to the expectations of
the EPSDT.184
Because Tennessee did not fully clarify the expectations of the
EPSDT program in its behavioral health care contract, the BHOs
have not effectively executed the EPSDT. 185 Tennessee undoubtedly
could have benefited from constructing an incentive-based EPSDT
program instead of relying on two conflicting and relatively short
clauses to ensure that BHOs obey the EPSDTs mandate. Instead, a
court may have to step in to ensure that BHOs implement the
EPSDT.186
180. For an overview of the terms that a provider contract must include, see Perkins and
Rivera, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. at 1252-60 (cited in note 49).
181. Provider Risk Contract at 11-12 (cited in note 166).
182. Id. at 11. 41 CFR § 441.61 states that providers must be qualified and willing to per-
form EPSDT services.
183. Those services are limitations on outpatient mental health services and substance
abuse. Provider Risk Contract at 12 (cited in note 166).
184. See Part III.
185. See EPSDT Annual Report (cited in note 56) (citing lower than mandated screening
numbers under the EPSDT).
186. See Part III.
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B. TennCare Partners and 'Medically Necessary"
In the TennCare Partners program, the two BHOs decide what
is medically necessary in accordance with the definition in their con-
tract with the state. The contract uses one definition of "medically
necessary" for the entire BHO agreement:
[m]ental health and/or substance abuse services provided by an institution,
physician, or other qualified provider that are required to treat a TennCare
Partners Program Participant who meets certain mental health diagnostic and
impairment criteria. These services are necessary to maintain the Participant
in the least restrictive setting that is appropriate for his special needs, to
prevent unnecessary hospitalizations, and to improve his or her functioning
level and quality of life.
187
While it is doubtful that Tennessee considered the previously
described models'8 in preparing its managed care contract, the
definition does not require an underlying mental disorder to qualify
for mental treatment and thus does not follow the normal function
model. 189 Although the contract may vaguely refer to an enrollee's
need to meet "certain" mental health criteria, it does not specify the
criteria. 190 In fact, the standard that a medically necessary service is
one needed to improve the enrollee's "functioning lever' and "quality
of life" seems to be closer to the expansive welfare model, with
enhanced potential for happiness as the standard for what is
"medically necessary. 19, Therefore, Tennessee's definition does not
necessarily conflict with the EPSDT. As discussed earlier, however,
any attempt by a state to apply a more limiting definition of
"medically necessary" would probably conflict with the EPSDT's broad
coverage and would not be a permissible method for denying care that
the provider deems necessary. 92
As a result, were Tennessee required to meet the HCFA's
eighty percent screening goal, the number of mental defects discov-
ered by screening would undoubtedly rise. Without a limiting defini-
tion of "medically necessary" in line with the normal function model,
the breadth of mental deficiencies open for discovery during the
screening process could be very wide. Then, after a provider found
187. Provider Risk Contract, Attachment A "Definitions" (cited in note 166).
188. For discussion of the models, see Part IV.A.
189. Compare the proposed Health Security Act, see note 155, to the definition quoted in
note 187 and accompanying text.
190. Provider Risk Contract, Attachment A "Definitions" (cited in note 166).
191. See Part IV for a complete discussion of the welfare model.
192. See Part IV.D.
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mental deficiency, the treatments that Tennessee would be required
to cover could be equally broad. 193 While peer reviews or prior
authorization might limit the providers' decisions, if Medicaid covers
the treatment for anyone else, effectively, Tennessee would have no
say in the provider's decision. As a result, the cost of meeting the
EPSDT requirements could offset the savings of managed care. 194
VI. CONCLUSION
As more states move to managed care to control Medicaid
costs, they must plan for expansive programs like the EPSDT which
may yield increased, and sometimes unexpected, costs. As
Tennessee's contract demonstrates, states often fail to convey
effectively the EPSDT requirements in their contracts with managed
care organizations. When the MCO then fails to meet the
requirements of the EPSDT, the state is exposed to liability for not
meeting its federal obligations.
With some planning in the contractual agreement, a state can
do more to ensure that the MCO carries out the preventive thrust of
the EPSDT. States can specify the requirements of the EPSDT in the
contract and encourage screenings with a financial incentive program.
But whether the state proactively steps up screening or a court
enforces the EPSDT's provisions, states may face increased costs from
the treatments flowing from the screenings. Congress must therefore
provide a clear mechanism for states seeking to control Medicaid costs
through a managed care system to use as one of the "limiting
principles" of the EPSDT, the states' traditional discretion to define
"medically necessary." As a state's most effective allocation tool, and
as a discretionary bulwark against expansive programs like the
EPSDT, the definition of what is "medically necessary" for mental
193. The EPSDT requires that any service that makes the defect better and is recognized
by Medicaid be covered if the provider finds it medically necessary. See Part IV.D.
194. To offset the savings of managed care, the EPSDT requirements must result in a great
increase in the number of screenings leading to utilization of the treatment options under the
EPSDT. This increase in screenings could come from either the state incentive program or a
courts injunction. As the EPSDT presently stands in Tennessee, however, the costs are not a
major threat as only 15% of over 630,000 children who qualified for screenings received at least
one screening between October 1, 1994 and September 30, 1995. EPSDT Annual Report (cited
in note 56). Approximately 95,000 children were screened in that period. Id. Such low
numbers probably do not imply the downfall of TennCare at this stage. However, if Tennessee
were suddenly required to meet HCFA's 80% screening requirements, or if another similarly
positioned state were to implement incentive programs, then the necessity for limits by way of
applying the "medically necessary" definition to the EPSDT would become apparent.
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health care is a critical component in allowing managed care to meet
its financial goals while still meeting the goals of the EPSDT.
John A. Flippen*
* The Author wishes to thank Michelle Johnson of the Tennessee Justice Center for her
help in securing sources for this Note. I would also like to thank Professors James F. Blumstein
and Ellen W. Clayton for their insights on this sometimes difficult topic. In addition, my
editors, Courtney Persons, Brian Duffy, Erik Elsea, and Owen Donley deserve great adoration-
for their guidance and counsel. Finally, I would like to thank my brother, Shaw Flippen, who
has opened his home to me during my law school years and so graciously allowed me to blanket
the house with research material and coffee cups while preparing this Note.
713

